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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, t Case No. 920234-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
ARTHUR RIBE, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issue is presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a standard "knock-
and-announce" search warrant even though the officers executing 
the warrant did not "knock-and-wait" for a response before 
entering defendant's residence, thereby violating Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-23-10 (1990)? 
"Because of the trial court's advantageous position in 
determining the factual basis for a motion to suppress, that 
determination should not be reversed unless it is clearly 
erroneous." State v. Roth. 827 P.2d 255, 256 (Utah App. 1992) 
(citations omitted). Also, under the circumstances of this case, 
the trial court's ultimate decision not to exclude the seized 
evidence despite the officers' violation of § 77-23-10 is a legal 
conclusion, which this Court reviews de novo. ££.. State v. Rowe, 
806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991) (The question of an officer's 
good faith reliance on an improper nighttime search authorization 
is subject to de novo review.), rev'd on other grounds, 196 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah September 28, 1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, house, papers and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-10 (1990). Force used in 
executing warrant — Notice of authority prerequisite, when. 
When a search warrant has been issued 
authorizing entry into any building, room, 
conveyance, compartment or other enclosure, 
the officer executing the warrant may use 
such force as is reasonably necessary to 
enter: 
(1) If, after notice of his authority 
and purpose, there is no response or he is 
not admitted with reasonable promptness; or 
(2) Without notice of his authority and 
purpose, if the magistrate issuing the 
warrant directs in the warrant that the 
officer need not give notice. The magistrate 
shall so direct only upon proof, under oath, 
that the object of the search may be quickly 
destroyed, disposed of, or secreted, or that 
physical harm may result to any person if 
notice were given. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 
1991) (R. 6). Pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 
1988), defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty, thereby 
reserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress (R. 72-8). The trial court sentenced 
defendant to a term of zero to five years in the Utah State 
Prison. The court stayed execution of that sentence and placed 
defendant on probation (R. 92-3). Defendant is not presently 
incarcerated. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
On March 19, 1991, detectives Kevin Judd and Craig 
Watson, along with other officers from the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office and the Metro Narcotics Strike Force, went to 
defendant's residence to execute a standard "knock-and-announce" 
search warrant. As the officers approached the residence, 
defendant was exiting the front door of the house. Upon seeing 
the officers, defendant began running from the scene (R. 179, 
207-08). 
Some of the officers pursued defendant while others 
went to the front door of the house. Throughout the encounter, 
the officers repeatedly yelled such phrases as "[p]olice," 
1
 The State recites the facts in the light most favorable to 
the court's ruling. State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 501 (Utah 
1989). 
3 
" [s]earch warrant; police," ,f[s]top running. Police," and 
"[s]top Ringo2; police" before entering defendant's residence 
(R. 173, 174, 181, 183, 202, 208, 209). 
As Judd approached the residence, he saw some of his 
fellow officers run past his left shoulder in pursuit of 
defendant. Judd then knew that his assignment was to go to the 
front door (R. 207-08). The interior front door was open, and 
the exterior storm door was closed but not locked (R. 175-76, 
208-09). As Judd explained, "[t]he interior door was wide open. 
I could see right into the living room" (R. 208). Defendant's 
wife and daughter were sitting in the living room, and the 
marijuana that was the subject of the search warrant was 
approximately five feet from defendant's wife (R. 150-51). 
Judd testified that he never knocked on the storm door 
(R. 210). Rather, "[he] ran to the front door[,] grabbed the 
door and called, 'Police,' and ran in. Directly off to [his] 
left was [defendant's] wife sitting on a couch" (R. 209). 
Because the interior door was already open, Judd only opened the 
unlocked storm door3, stepped through the open doorway and 
yelled, "[p]olice. Don't move" (R. 209). According to Judd, he 
did not use any devices, such as a crowbar or battering ram, to 
2
 "Ringo" is defendant's nickname. 
3
 Even defendant's wife admitted that "[t]he outer [storm] 
door has no latch or nothing [sic] on it. So it is just open 
right now" (R. 196). 
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gain entry/ 
The other officers secured defendant approximately ten 
feet away from the residence (R. 168, 200). The officers then 
realized that the search warrant had been inadvertently left on a 
desk at the police station. Detective Rick Lewis was sent to 
retrieve the warrant, and he returned approximately 25 minutes 
later. The officers then showed the search warrant to both 
defendant and his wife, and seized the marijuana (R. 169, 184-85, 
211-12). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State concedes that the officers in this case 
violated Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1990) when they entered 
defendant's residence without first knocking and waiting for a 
response because the search warrant did not contain a no-knock 
authorization and there were no exigent circumstances to justify 
entry on a no-knock basis. Nevertheless, under the criteria 
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 
700 (Utah 1988), the trial court properly denied defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
Suppression is not an appropriate remedy in this case 
because the police conduct did not constitute an egregious 
violation of § 77-23-10, and none of the basic interests that 
4
 Defendant's wife testified that the interior door was 
closed, but not locked, and that the officers pounded on the door 
several times and eventually pried it open (R. 188-90). The 
trial court expressly rejected that testimony and found that 
defendant's wife "was not a credible witness in any respect" and 
that her testimony "was contradicted by the testimony of everyone 
else" (R. 237). 
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support the "knock-and-wait" requirement were appreciably 
compromised by the violation. Moreover, there is nothing in the 
record that indicates defendant was substantially prejudiced by 
the violation or that the police officers executed the search in 
bad-faith, which according to State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 
14 (September 28, 1992), are the touchstones for determining that 
suppression is an appropriate remedy for a statutory violation. 
This Court should therefore uphold the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress and affirm defendant's conviction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALTHOUGH THE OFFICERS DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-10 
(1990), THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS BECAUSE THE 
VIOLATION WAS NOT EGREGIOUS AND THE BASIC 
INTERESTS THAT SUPPORT THE KNOCK-AND-WAIT 
REQUIREMENT WERE SATISFIED. 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress based on its assessment of the police conduct as it 
related to the requirements and purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 77-
23-10 (1990). In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the 
trial court made the following findings from the bench: 
Based upon [the testimony in this case], 
I'm going to deny the motion to suppress for 
the following reasons. We had here a 
standard search warrant that was executed. 
That search warrant did not have a no-knock 
exception. In other words, it required that 
the police announce their presence. 
My finding is that the police did 
announce their presence. That was the 
testimony of the witness Watson and the 
witness Judd. 
Further, its my finding that the 
6 
circumstances were such that, and all of the 
witnesses attested to this, the defendant was 
exiting the home as the police arrived, heard 
the police identify themselves as police, saw 
them in uniform, saw them in the vicinity of 
police vehicles, and that, according to the 
testimony of at least some of the police 
officers, he fled from police. 
It's my finding that actual notice is 
the legal requirement, and that occurred in 
this instance. 
Further, it's my finding that based upon 
the testimony of Officers Watson and Judd, 
the door in question was open, not closed, 
obviating in part the knock requirement, 
especially in view of the fact that the 
testimony was clear that the defendant had 
already seen these individuals as he was 
exiting, or as he had already exited the 
[house]. 
It's further my finding that Mrs. Ribe, 
who testified on behalf of the defendant, to 
the fact that there was considerable damage 
done to the door frame and pounding against 
the door frame, was not a credible witness in 
any respect. Her testimony was not supported 
by anyone else, and in fact was contradicted 
by the testimony of everyone else. No one 
heard these sounds or saw the damage that she 
described. 
And based upon the foregoing, as I 
indicated, I am denying the motion to 
suppress. 
(R. 236-38). (These pages of the record are attached hereto as 
Addendum A.) 
The trial court also entered a brief, written order 
denying defendant's motion (R. 59-60). The court's order, in its 
entirety, reads as follows: 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came on 
for decision on September 6, at 8:15 A.M. 
before the Honorable Leslie Lewis. 
After having reviewed the transcripts 
and having heard argument from the parties 
the Court ruled that the police did in fact 
announce their presence, that the testimony 
of the Defendant's wife was lacking in 
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credibility in view of the totality of facts 
and circumstances and that the police 
announced their presence and the defendant 
saw them and that the police had a search 
warrant, and that [although] the storm door 
was closed[,J the wooden door was open. 
Therefore, the Motion to Suppress was denied. 
(R. 59-60) (A copy of the trial court's order is attached hereto 
as Addendum B.) 
Stated more precisely, the trial court ruled that § 77-
23-10 requires that notice of the police authority and purpose be 
given, and it found that that requirement was satisfied. There 
is ample evidence to support the trial court's factual finding. 
The record makes clear that the officers repeatedly identified 
themselves as police officers, and Watson testified that the 
officers yelled, "Search warrant; police" prior to their entry 
into defendant's residence (R. 173, 174, 181, 183, 202, 208, 
209). 
However, absent a specific "no-knock" authorization in 
the warrant or exigent circumstances, the statute also requires 
that officers "knock-and-wait" for a response before entering. 
Buck, 756 P.2d at 702. The trial court found not only that the 
warrant did not authorize service on a "no-knock" basis, but also 
that the officers did not knock-and-wait as required by the 
statute (R. 238).5 However, suppression was not an appropriate 
5
 The State has conceded that there were no exigent 
circumstances to justify a no-knock entry (R. 222). As the 
record demonstrates, the officers did not have reason to believe 
that the ten pounds of marijuana could be quickly disposed of or 
that defendant would have weapons or would pose a threat to the 
officers (R. 203-205). 
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remedy because, under the circumstances, the officers' failure to 
knock-and-wait was not an egregious violation of the statute, and 
the interests that support the knock-and-wait requirement were 
not infringed upon. 
The seminal Utah case addressing violations of Utah's 
knock-and-announce statute is State v. Buck, 756 P.2d 700 (Utah 
1988). In Buck, no one was present when the officers initially 
entered the defendant's residence. Nevertheless, the officers 
clearly violated the knock-and-announce requirement by making a 
forced entry into the defendant's residence on a no-knock basis 
even though the search warrant did not authorize a no-knock 
service. JId. at 701-02. In determining what remedy was 
appropriate, the Court analyzed the violation in terms of how it 
affected the interests that the statute was intended to protect. 
As the Buck Court explained: 
The basic interests that support the 
knock-and-announce requirement are (1) the 
protection of an individual's private 
activities within his home, (2) the 
prevention of violence and physical injury to 
both police and occupants which [sic] may 
result from an unannounced police entry, and 
(3) the prevention of property damage 
resulting from forced entry. 
Buck, 756 P.2d at 701 (citations omitted). 
The Buck Court concluded that "[i]£ no one is present 
to admit the officers executing the warrant, two of the three 
interests are not implicated. Execution of a warrant does not 
invade the privacy of a person who is not home except to the 
extent it would have been invaded anyway and no one is endangered 
9 
by an unannounced police intrusion [when no one is present]*" 
Id. Finally, because a forced entry would have taken place 
anyway, the third interest was not compromised. 
Although this case is different from Buck because 
defendant and his wife were on the premises at the time the 
warrant was served, Buck is still controlling insofar as it 
identifies the interests that are advanced by the knock-and-
announce requirement and the analysis that is to be employed when 
a violation has occurred. As demonstrated below, none of the 
interests identified in Buck were appreciably compromised by the 
police conduct in this case. 
The first interest advanced by the knock-and-announce 
requirement is the protection of an individual's private 
activities within his home. Here, it is undisputed that 
defendant was outside the residence as the police approached. 
Upon seeing the police and hearing them identify themselves as 
police officers, defendant fled. Judd was already at the front 
of the house as he saw his fellow officers run past him in 
pursuit of defendant. He then "grabbed the door" and again 
called "[p]olice" (R. 209). According to Judd, "[t]he interior 
door was wide open [and he] could see right into the living room" 
(R. 208). Defendant's wife and daughter were sitting on a couch 
with the marijuana approximately five feet away from defendant's 
wife (R. 150-01). Judd opened the storm door, stepped inside and 
yelled, M[p]olice. Don't move" (R. 209). 
The activities within the house were clearly visible to 
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Judd through the open door. Moreover, defendant was not even in 
the house, but had instead elected to flee from the police. The 
trial court recognized both of these factors in its ruling and 
noted that they "obviated in part" the need to knock-and-wait (R. 
237). Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how the 
protection of defendant's private activities within the residence 
was diminished to an appreciably greater degree than it would 
have been had Judd watched the activities that occurred inside 
the house from the other side of the storm door. ££. State v. 
Suits, 243 N.W.2d 206, 209 (Wis. 1976) (Because the front door 
was open and the officers could see inside the house, "[i]t is 
difficult to maintain that the privacy of the living room 
occupants was any more violated by the officers' presence inside 
of the threshold rather than a few feet back."). 
The second purpose for the knock-and-announce 
requirement, "the prevention of violence and injury to both 
police and occupants which [sic] may result from an unannounced 
police entry," was also satisfied by the police conduct in this 
case for two reasons. Buck, 756 P.2d at 701. First, this was 
not an "unannounced" entry, and second, Judd's conduct did not 
increase the likelihood of violence or injury to the parties 
involved. 
As the trial court found, the police announced their 
authority before entering defendant's residence (R. 236). 
Indeed, even defendant acknowledged that he heard one of the 
officers yell "[p]olice. Stop." and that the officers "jumped on 
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[him], and pulled [him] to the ground" when he was approximately 
ten feet away from the house (R. 200-02). Watson testified that 
one of the officers yelled, "Search warrant; police" (R. 173). 
Similarly, Judd testified that he shouted "police" when he was at 
the corner of the yard and again as he was running toward 
defendant (R. 208). When he was at the front door and could see 
that defendant was still running, Judd yelled, "Stop, Ringo; 
police" (R. 208). At that point, Judd saw other officers run 
past him in pursuit of defendant (R. 209). 
Given that defendant was attempting to elude the 
police, Judd's decision to open the door and step inside the 
doorway served to prevent defendant's wife from similarly 
attempting to flee. Had defendant's wife been allowed an 
opportunity to flee and elected to do so, the risk that either 
she or the officers would have been injured because of the 
ensuing struggle would have increased. Consequently, under the 
circumstances, Judd's conduct may actually have served to prevent 
precisely the type of violence or injury the knock-and-wait 
requirement is normally intended to curtail. Certainly, there is 
nothing that suggests that Judd's conduct heightened the risk of 
such injury. The second interest that supports the knock-and-
announce requirement was therefore preserved in this case. 
The third interest that is advanced by the knock-and-
announce requirement is "the prevention of property damage 
resulting from forced entry . ; . which usually is the least 
significant interest of the three. . . . " Buck, 756 P.2d at 701. 
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In this case, Judd merely opened the storm, which was unlocked, 
and stepped through the open doorway. No property was damaged by 
Judd's entry. The outcome was no different than it would have 
been had Judd knocked and waited for defendant's wife to respond. 
If defendant's wife would have admitted Judd, Judd would have 
entered the home. If she had either ignored or refused to admit 
Judd — or even attempted to flee like defendant, then Judd would 
have been justified in opening the door himself. Consequently, 
the third justification for the knock-and-wait requirement is not 
implicated in this case. 
Although the trial court did not expressly rely on the 
criteria established in Buck when announcing its findings, it is 
clear from the record that the trial court considered the Buck 
analysis in reaching its determinations (R. 215-18). The trial 
court recognized that the officers did not knock-and-wait as 
required by the statute, but in perhaps somewhat unartfully 
phrased findings, the court explained why the officers' failure 
to knock on the storm door and await a response was not an 
egregious violation of the statute (R. 59, 236-37). 
The officers' no-knock manner of entry was not 
authorized by the warrant or by exigent circumstances. However, 
the officers' conduct does not constitute an egregious violation 
of § 77-23-10. As in Buck, the violation "did not contribute 
appreciably to the invasion of privacy already authorized by the 
warrant." Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. Consequently, the trial 
court's approach to defendant's motion to suppress and its denial 
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of that motion are both consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Buck, Moreover, although it had not been decided at 
the time of defendant's case, the Utah Supreme Court's recent 
decision is State v. Rowe, 196 P.2d 14 (Utah September 28, 1992), 
provides additional support for the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion to suppress. 
In the course of discussing a violation of Utah's 
nighttime search authorization provision, the Utah Supreme Court 
reaffirmed the analysis it adopted in State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 
1366 (Utah 1987), for instances in which police fail to comply 
with statutory requirements. In Rowe, the court reiterated that 
suppression of evidence is an appropriate 
remedy for illegal police conduct only when 
that conduct implicates a fundamental 
violation of a defendant's rights: 
"Only a 'fundamental' violation of [a 
rule of criminal procedure] requires 
automatic suppression, and a violation is 
'fundamental' only where it, in effect, 
renders the search unconstitutional under 
traditional fourth amendment standards. 
Where the alleged violation . . . is not 
'fundamental' suppression is required only 
where: (1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense 
that the search might not have occurred or 
would not have been so abrasive if the [r]ule 
had been followed, or (2) there is evidence 
of intentional and deliberate disregard of a 
provision of the [r]ule. . . . 
. . . It is only where the violation 
also implicates fundamental, constitutional 
concerns, is conducted in bad-faith or has 
substantially prejudiced the defendant that 
exclusion may be an appropriate remedy." 
Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15 (quoting Fixel) (footnotes 
omitted). After determining that Rowe was not substantially 
prejudiced by the police violation, and that there was no 
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evidence that the officers had executed the search in bad-faith, 
the court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that suppression 
was not warranted. .Id. at 16. 
Similarly, there is nothing in the record that 
indicates that defendant was "substantially prejudiced" by Judd's 
failure to knock-and-wait as is required under § 77-23-10. Nor 
is there any evidence that the officers conducted the search in 
"bad-faith." Indeed, as was true in Buck, defendant does not 
"claim that either the fact of entry or the search and seizure 
was otherwise unlawful. The claim is only that the manner of 
entry was unlawful." Buck, 756 P.2d at 703. This Court should 
therefore uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress because it is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's decisions in Buck and Rowe. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress 
and affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ tS^ day of November, 
1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
TODD A. UTZJ^GER* 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
] I by officers shouting, "Police,,l CJUit u! 1 IIIMLII stepped insi.de 
2 the doorway and said, *fPolices, freeze." 
3 I V offends reasonableness 
4 I of the Constitutio articularly J -arranted search, 
5 I and that it meets the Mapp standard, where 
6 I the lesson about 
7 their conduct. 
8 THE COURT: All right, thank you, * Lemcke. 
9 C nee again 
:i 0 reviewed ranscript fron •• hearing that vac 
J ] iifM in iitji'i of me, believe that was on May 30th . 
3 2: tl: v^ar-
1 3 preliminary hearing transcript that was requested by both 
1 4 I cc viewed the memos, including the most 
15 I recent one submitted I '/ Mi , ll,reeze( 
16 J considered the testimony as I heard it i 
1 7 lieai i in "i to assessments * he credibility 
18 and demeanor itnesses wno appeax 
19 Based upon that motion to 
20 J liuppu's.s iui Hie io'lJ We had here standard 
21 I search warrant that was executed searcn wax ciuiini 
22 not havf a n."- -knock exception. In other words, it required 
23 11 in 
24 J My finding is that the police announce their 
25 I presence. That was the testimony of "I witness Watson and 
0236 
1 J the witness Judd. 
2 J Further, itfs my finding that the circumstances 
3 I were such that, and all of the witnesses attested to this, 
4 J the defendant was exiting the home as the police arrived, 
5 I heard the police identify themselves as police, saw them in 
6 J uniform, saw them in the vicinity of police vehicles, and 
7 J that, according to the testimony of at least some of the 
8 police officers, he fled from the police. 
9 It's my finding that actual notice is the legal 
10 requirement, and that occurred in this instance. 
11 Further, itfs my finding that based upon the 
12 I testimony of Officers Watson and Judd, the door in question 
13 was open, not closed, obviating in part the knock 
14 requirement, especially in view of the fact that the 
15 testimony was clear that the defendant had already seen 
16 these individuals as he was exiting, or as he had already 
17 J exited the vehicle. 
18 I Itfs further my finding that Mrs. Ribe, who 
19 J testified on behalf of the defendant, to the fact that 
20 J there was considerable damage done to the door frame and 
21 J pounding against the door frame, was not a credible witness 
22 J in any respect. Her testimony was not supported by anyone 
23 I else, and in fact was contradicted by the testimony of 
24 I everyone else. No one heard these sounds or saw the damage 
25 that she described. 
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L U I L U L L L I I 
lenying the motio suppress. Thai beinq the etisp, 
spears at t h i s poir1 :me that we need fi > ot t h i s 
th EMI! II" II Jl I'lispositli I I M l I' l l f i i i M l 
MR. BREEZE ctuall; en set ill for an 
entrapment hearing, Your Honor. 
Till1! I r 1 J P T , All I in iiiiiJvll „, in , in cj i i l , u II I'm,' n .-.xl 
\ l When would you like to ha .,/e that set? 
M R . B R E E Z E : I > Il II I  i IM, Il II u III;; n o f f f n ni I he 1s t 
.rough Lhe I6tJi ot October , sir; am j,,1" III: 11111= jthe i* than thi.it: 
e iine, 
11 IK < 
*~r entrapment, which apparent. contemplated 
ten days. This matter has been 
I think certainly Mr. Ribe *- entitled *-~ 1 
matters that you deeu lii IM< important heard, 
p c e i l y I i li  dii 1 ft i i d I in in I: l i i:1 • "!»,•" mi: ill: 
^trapmer is not dispositive, I'd like 1: :» 
— * you have that filed within tei i days, ^*« » * 3 . 
MR. BREEZE ~ertainly, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, ten days from toda .uxd 
Lemcke, _ _ respon^ • i 
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ADDENDUM B 
Ti'iird JuriiCi?."1 D:3tr-ct 
ROBERT BREEZE #4278 
Attorney for Defendant 
211 East Broadway #215 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 322-2138 
B^y-X-t : 
f>, , .1 
&IXZL 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 1 OR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
[UP-
STATE 
F 
vs . 
ARTHUR RIBE, 
L 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
~M900559 
n u n u i o w i c i / v o l i 6 L e W i S 
I •• : ii'inif ( in t i J ir 
Septembe Mm i difi I 
A f t e r • , r i p t s anc I 
fact announce their presence, that the testimony of the ueienaanx 
wif - as ,i.nhsrent°l y nnhel i pvahlfe and that the police did not ncod~r^ u *~* 
jlAujurs^J^ — **~* JZA*~ ^ ^ 2^ H^ r^* v^/^ 
t '
 t -purpose or wait foi a i^abunable time ^Z^Z^ 
_ , _ _ ^L#^X *A*»**' _ - - i iiifin * ".-in i » ^ * v U * 
for t h e o c c u p a n t s * v o l u n t a r i l y admi t t h e p o l i c e fret—the puipu-s?" 
.j&k—tr*-etrcrtThg " + F^ s e a r c h w a i r a u l beeausey *hii»e t h e s t o i nm c:lc c • i was 
c. 1 n R f> ;;; nm i py1 a 5 inn in i g i \ . T I j g i UP f ry i g | j i g I | r + S r i j I ry 5 "! I p D 1 6 S S 
UUUUiJtf 
was denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED this 7^>t day of September, 1991. 
BY THE/QOURT: 
Leslie Lewis, Distri 
/ /?^ 
Court Judge 
and 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING, 
I caused a copy of the foregoing to be mailed to: 
Howard Lemcke 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Arthur Ribe ^ -
5175 South 4340 West~^*W£/ 
Kearns, Utah 84118 
on this iS^Lls? dapf\f September, 1991. Fnr\ 
APPROVED AS TO^FORM AND CONTENT! 
Howa LemjCKe 
Deputy Comity At torney 
? 
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